Browser history as a tool for fraud: why investors are losing millions of Ethereum

The “Recent Transactions” feature in the wallet browser is not just a convenience; it’s a potential threat. A cryptocurrency investor recently learned this lesson the hard way, losing 4,556 Ethereum, worth approximately $12.4 million. The tragedy occurred due to a dangerous combination: a vulnerability in the wallet interface and human habit of trusting browser history when verifying addresses.

The danger of the “Recent Transactions” feature: how browser history became a trap

The attack mechanism was clever. The hacker began with a thorough analysis of the victim’s activity over two months, focusing on the deposit address used for OTC transactions. Then, the attacker used specialized software to generate cryptographic addresses until creating a duplicate wallet—an address matching the first and last characters of the original.

This was possible due to a human perception vulnerability. Users checking a long hexadecimal address often only pay close attention to the beginning and end. The middle, where differences between the real and fake account are, is often ignored or hidden by the interface to save screen space.

The decisive moment was a small test transaction sent to the victim’s wallet. This strategic move filled the activity log, and the compromised address rose to the top of the “Recent Transactions” list—precisely where the investor usually copied the details from.

Digital address doppelgänger: from idea to mass phenomenon

According to blockchain analyst pseudonym Specter, the theft occurred 32 hours after the “poisoned” address was inserted into the browser history. During this short period, the victim attempted to transfer $12.4 million and copied the fake details from their transaction history instead of the genuine source.

This was not the first case. In recent weeks, a second major theft occurred using a nearly identical scheme: another trader lost about $50 million. Experts from Scam Sniffer note a troubling trend: such attacks are becoming widespread precisely because users habitually rely on browser history when choosing an address for transfer.

Protection against attacks: why whitelists are more effective than browser history

The paradox is that large institutional players rarely fall victim to such schemes. Organizations handling millions typically implement strict address verification procedures, including creating “whitelists” of pre-verified wallets and conducting test micro-transactions before the main transfer.

Retail traders, however, often take the path of least resistance, trusting interface convenience and browser history. Security experts strongly recommend abandoning this practice. Instead of copying addresses from history, use verified address books with manual verification of each character.

The point is that browser history is a convenience tool, not a security measure. In a world where one mistake can cost millions, convenience must give way to reliability.