The Master said: Look at the reasons; observe the sources; examine what they rest upon. How can a person hide? How can a person hide?
Yang Bojun: Confucius said: “Examine the friends a person associates with; observe the methods he uses to achieve certain goals; understand his mood, what he is at ease with, and what he is uneasy about. Then, how can this person hide himself? How can this person hide himself?”
Qian Mu: The teacher said: “Observe why he does this thing; observe how he does it; observe his mood while doing it—whether he is at ease or uneasy. By such observation, where can he hide? Where can he hide?”
Li Zehou: Confucius said: “Look at his actions, examine their origins and details, understand his psychological attachments—where can he hide? Where can he hide?”
Detailed explanation:
Confucius, the pioneer of the CIA and KGB? After reading the interpretations of these three, one cannot help but have this doubt. The so-called “I-centered” logic of the腐儒 (corrupt scholars) is now on full display. The only realistic assumption behind these explanations is: starting from the “I-centered” perspective, there are only two types of people—those who conform to “me” and those who do not; the former are friends, the latter are enemies. The concepts of observing, looking, understanding in these three explanations are all from an “I-centered” standpoint. The final claim that no one can hide is actually based on this premise: under the “I-centered” view, everyone can be classified, and no one can escape. Under this logic, the human world is constructed as follows: everyone classifies others based on “me,” and the world of humans is divided and fractured in this mutual classification.
From then on, human society becomes a concentration camp of “chickens, ducks, geese, rabbits,” where everyone strips others naked through so-called “vision, observation, and understanding,” only to be stripped themselves in turn. Then, all sorts of games—seduction, rape, self-torture, BDSM, N.P., etc.—are played out. The腐儒 (corrupt scholars) place this chapter under “governing,” and their concept of politics is essentially seduction, rape, self-torture, BDSM, N.P. Over the past two thousand years, politics has been shaped into these perverse acts, a self-perpetuating cycle of corruption and distortion, forming the non-prior-based foundational structure of social systems.
In fact, this chapter has nothing to do with the two thousand years of腐儒’s “I-centered” nonsense. The resulting parsing of “视其所以;观其所由;察其所安。人焉廋哉?人焉廋哉?” is completely wrong. The correct parsing should be: “视,其所以;观,其所由;察,其所安。人焉廋哉?人焉廋哉?” where “以” means “by means of”; “由” means “follow”; “安” means “place”; “廋” means “curved, hidden.” The “其” refers to any individual person, i.e., the individual reality of “people” within the “heaven, earth, and human” structure. Reality must have its “hazards,” and these hazards are ranked by “not being troubled.” The individual reality of “people” also follows this principle. This chapter discusses the “hazards” of different ranked individual realities, based on the “not being troubled.” It must be pointed out that this “not being troubled” of the individual in the “heaven, earth, and human” structure is actually its “hazard.” There is no absolute “not being troubled”; this has been explained earlier in the discussion of “hazard” and “not being troubled.”
From the perspective of the individual self-system, its “not being troubled” structure cannot be examined because, in that context, “not being troubled” is the basis of all reasoning and the basis of structural examination. Any examination is a tautology, similar to the mutual proof within Euclidean geometry between the sum of interior angles of a triangle being 180 degrees and the uniqueness of parallel lines. But from the “heaven, earth, and human” structure, the “not being troubled” of the individual becomes its “hazard,” thus it has a rank. Examining its internal structure then becomes possible, like stepping outside Euclidean, Riemannian, or Lobachevskian geometries to analyze their axiomatic structures, classifying based on the sum of interior angles of triangles. Similarly, this chapter classifies the “hazard” structure of individual humans’ “not being troubled,” leading to the concept of “vision, observation, and understanding” of individual “hazard” structures. That is why Confucius lamented: “How can a person hide? How can a person hide?” In simple terms, it is like saying “people are just so,” akin to the axiomatic view that the sum of interior angles of a triangle being 180 degrees is no longer mysterious—just so.
Over two thousand years later, Western philosophy introduced Kant, who thoroughly studied human innate faculties (within the “Analects” discourse system, this corresponds to the aforementioned individual “not being troubled”) and wrote the three major critiques of modern philosophy, becoming the most important source of modern philosophy. From then on, philosophy could not avoid Kant. This chapter of the Analects, which is Confucius’ three critiques, holds the same significance as Kant’s, and must be contrasted with Kant for deeper understanding. How can one know the “hazard” without knowing the “not being troubled”? If one does not know the “hazard,” how can one not be troubled?
Kant divided human cognition into lower “sensation” and higher “reason.” Sensation is the beginning of cognition, the realm that cannot be surpassed, and the object and material of higher cognition. Higher cognition includes understanding, judgment, and reason. Experience is not a direct result of sensation but the result of understanding synthesizing sensory data. For example, the so-called natural world in scientific research, or even each individual person, these experiences and objects of cognition are not grasped by sensation alone but are the result of understanding’s作用 (function). Judgment, more precisely, the regulative judgment, is the capacity to apply innate laws of understanding to form experience and recognize objects. Reason is the capacity to extend the innate laws of understanding as far as possible, often leading to absolute subjective ideas like God, the world, and the soul. But once reason extends itself to treat these幻想 (fantasies) as real entities, errors such as the immortality of the soul or the existence of God arise. Therefore, the scope of reason’s application must be limited, but this limitation is actually the practical premise for humans to escape natural necessity. Human rational practice presupposes the自由 (freedom) of the will (man’s higher desire capacity), which makes morality possible. But Kant argued that the practical premise of reason cannot be applied to实有 (actual existence); it only concerns what “should be,” not what “is.”
If understanding and reason are connected solely through regulative judgment, then humans become inevitable machines of necessity, and自由 (freedom) of the will becomes impossible, as does rational practice. Kant thus developed the “reflective judgment,” which allows for the协调 (coordination) of自由 (freedom) and necessity of understanding. Humans first create in art a unity of自然 (nature), morality, necessity, and自由 (freedom), and Kant extended this to the possibility of the world moving from necessity to自由 (freedom). Later, the movement extended by Leninism put this into practice, becoming an act of art in human society’s attempt to realize the transition from necessity to自由 (freedom) within Kant’s paradigm. Of course, this has nothing to do with Marx.
With Kant’s comparison, Confucius’ three critiques become clearer. “视” (vision), the relationship of seeing between humans and objects of cognition, corresponds to the higher human cognition formed by understanding and reason connected through sensation—i.e., all human cognition; “观” (view), the perspective, corresponds to “reflective judgment” connected to自由 (free) will; “察” (examine), the immediate “direct observation,” is the practical application of自由 (free) will in the present moment. “视,其所以” (vision, its basis) is the cognitive ability humans rely on; “观,其所由” (view, its source) is the自由 (free) will humans follow; “察,其所安” (examine, its resting place) is the immediate practice of自由 (free) will, the ultimate reliance of humans. Confucius is wiser than Kant because he, like Marx, does not assume a path from necessity to自由 (freedom) in art. If you are already free, why seek freedom? Leninism is a necessary extension of Kant’s path of art, but it has nothing to do with Marx or Confucius’ “Way of the Sage.”
Chán (Zen) plain translation:
The Master said: Look at the reasons; observe the sources; examine what they rest upon. How can a person hide? How can a person hide?
Confucius said: Recognition ability, what humans rely on; free will, what humans follow; immediate direct “viewing,” the immediate practice of free will, the ultimate reliance of humans. Where is there curvature in humans? Where is there curvature in humans?
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加密数字货币交易所-《论语》详解:给所有曲解孔子的人-子曰:视,其所以;观,其所由;察,其所安。人焉廋哉?人焉廋哉?
The Master said: Look at the reasons; observe the sources; examine what they rest upon. How can a person hide? How can a person hide?
Yang Bojun: Confucius said: “Examine the friends a person associates with; observe the methods he uses to achieve certain goals; understand his mood, what he is at ease with, and what he is uneasy about. Then, how can this person hide himself? How can this person hide himself?”
Qian Mu: The teacher said: “Observe why he does this thing; observe how he does it; observe his mood while doing it—whether he is at ease or uneasy. By such observation, where can he hide? Where can he hide?”
Li Zehou: Confucius said: “Look at his actions, examine their origins and details, understand his psychological attachments—where can he hide? Where can he hide?”
Detailed explanation:
Confucius, the pioneer of the CIA and KGB? After reading the interpretations of these three, one cannot help but have this doubt. The so-called “I-centered” logic of the腐儒 (corrupt scholars) is now on full display. The only realistic assumption behind these explanations is: starting from the “I-centered” perspective, there are only two types of people—those who conform to “me” and those who do not; the former are friends, the latter are enemies. The concepts of observing, looking, understanding in these three explanations are all from an “I-centered” standpoint. The final claim that no one can hide is actually based on this premise: under the “I-centered” view, everyone can be classified, and no one can escape. Under this logic, the human world is constructed as follows: everyone classifies others based on “me,” and the world of humans is divided and fractured in this mutual classification.
From then on, human society becomes a concentration camp of “chickens, ducks, geese, rabbits,” where everyone strips others naked through so-called “vision, observation, and understanding,” only to be stripped themselves in turn. Then, all sorts of games—seduction, rape, self-torture, BDSM, N.P., etc.—are played out. The腐儒 (corrupt scholars) place this chapter under “governing,” and their concept of politics is essentially seduction, rape, self-torture, BDSM, N.P. Over the past two thousand years, politics has been shaped into these perverse acts, a self-perpetuating cycle of corruption and distortion, forming the non-prior-based foundational structure of social systems.
In fact, this chapter has nothing to do with the two thousand years of腐儒’s “I-centered” nonsense. The resulting parsing of “视其所以;观其所由;察其所安。人焉廋哉?人焉廋哉?” is completely wrong. The correct parsing should be: “视,其所以;观,其所由;察,其所安。人焉廋哉?人焉廋哉?” where “以” means “by means of”; “由” means “follow”; “安” means “place”; “廋” means “curved, hidden.” The “其” refers to any individual person, i.e., the individual reality of “people” within the “heaven, earth, and human” structure. Reality must have its “hazards,” and these hazards are ranked by “not being troubled.” The individual reality of “people” also follows this principle. This chapter discusses the “hazards” of different ranked individual realities, based on the “not being troubled.” It must be pointed out that this “not being troubled” of the individual in the “heaven, earth, and human” structure is actually its “hazard.” There is no absolute “not being troubled”; this has been explained earlier in the discussion of “hazard” and “not being troubled.”
From the perspective of the individual self-system, its “not being troubled” structure cannot be examined because, in that context, “not being troubled” is the basis of all reasoning and the basis of structural examination. Any examination is a tautology, similar to the mutual proof within Euclidean geometry between the sum of interior angles of a triangle being 180 degrees and the uniqueness of parallel lines. But from the “heaven, earth, and human” structure, the “not being troubled” of the individual becomes its “hazard,” thus it has a rank. Examining its internal structure then becomes possible, like stepping outside Euclidean, Riemannian, or Lobachevskian geometries to analyze their axiomatic structures, classifying based on the sum of interior angles of triangles. Similarly, this chapter classifies the “hazard” structure of individual humans’ “not being troubled,” leading to the concept of “vision, observation, and understanding” of individual “hazard” structures. That is why Confucius lamented: “How can a person hide? How can a person hide?” In simple terms, it is like saying “people are just so,” akin to the axiomatic view that the sum of interior angles of a triangle being 180 degrees is no longer mysterious—just so.
Over two thousand years later, Western philosophy introduced Kant, who thoroughly studied human innate faculties (within the “Analects” discourse system, this corresponds to the aforementioned individual “not being troubled”) and wrote the three major critiques of modern philosophy, becoming the most important source of modern philosophy. From then on, philosophy could not avoid Kant. This chapter of the Analects, which is Confucius’ three critiques, holds the same significance as Kant’s, and must be contrasted with Kant for deeper understanding. How can one know the “hazard” without knowing the “not being troubled”? If one does not know the “hazard,” how can one not be troubled?
Kant divided human cognition into lower “sensation” and higher “reason.” Sensation is the beginning of cognition, the realm that cannot be surpassed, and the object and material of higher cognition. Higher cognition includes understanding, judgment, and reason. Experience is not a direct result of sensation but the result of understanding synthesizing sensory data. For example, the so-called natural world in scientific research, or even each individual person, these experiences and objects of cognition are not grasped by sensation alone but are the result of understanding’s作用 (function). Judgment, more precisely, the regulative judgment, is the capacity to apply innate laws of understanding to form experience and recognize objects. Reason is the capacity to extend the innate laws of understanding as far as possible, often leading to absolute subjective ideas like God, the world, and the soul. But once reason extends itself to treat these幻想 (fantasies) as real entities, errors such as the immortality of the soul or the existence of God arise. Therefore, the scope of reason’s application must be limited, but this limitation is actually the practical premise for humans to escape natural necessity. Human rational practice presupposes the自由 (freedom) of the will (man’s higher desire capacity), which makes morality possible. But Kant argued that the practical premise of reason cannot be applied to实有 (actual existence); it only concerns what “should be,” not what “is.”
If understanding and reason are connected solely through regulative judgment, then humans become inevitable machines of necessity, and自由 (freedom) of the will becomes impossible, as does rational practice. Kant thus developed the “reflective judgment,” which allows for the协调 (coordination) of自由 (freedom) and necessity of understanding. Humans first create in art a unity of自然 (nature), morality, necessity, and自由 (freedom), and Kant extended this to the possibility of the world moving from necessity to自由 (freedom). Later, the movement extended by Leninism put this into practice, becoming an act of art in human society’s attempt to realize the transition from necessity to自由 (freedom) within Kant’s paradigm. Of course, this has nothing to do with Marx.
With Kant’s comparison, Confucius’ three critiques become clearer. “视” (vision), the relationship of seeing between humans and objects of cognition, corresponds to the higher human cognition formed by understanding and reason connected through sensation—i.e., all human cognition; “观” (view), the perspective, corresponds to “reflective judgment” connected to自由 (free) will; “察” (examine), the immediate “direct observation,” is the practical application of自由 (free) will in the present moment. “视,其所以” (vision, its basis) is the cognitive ability humans rely on; “观,其所由” (view, its source) is the自由 (free) will humans follow; “察,其所安” (examine, its resting place) is the immediate practice of自由 (free) will, the ultimate reliance of humans. Confucius is wiser than Kant because he, like Marx, does not assume a path from necessity to自由 (freedom) in art. If you are already free, why seek freedom? Leninism is a necessary extension of Kant’s path of art, but it has nothing to do with Marx or Confucius’ “Way of the Sage.”
Chán (Zen) plain translation:
The Master said: Look at the reasons; observe the sources; examine what they rest upon. How can a person hide? How can a person hide?
Confucius said: Recognition ability, what humans rely on; free will, what humans follow; immediate direct “viewing,” the immediate practice of free will, the ultimate reliance of humans. Where is there curvature in humans? Where is there curvature in humans?