"Greedy for drinks" soda water, can't handle the drinking table?

Ask AI · Why Over-Fixing the Banquet Table Scenario Has Left Mingren Growth Stuck in a Bind?

Zebra Consumption · Yang Wei

Mingren Soda’s 4 billion-yuan business was made over the banquet table.

As an invisible champion in the soda water category, it sidestepped strong distribution channels like Nongfu Spring and Wahaha. It seized the throne in baijiu consumption scenes with the slogan “Drink Mingren before and after drinking,” becoming the king in white liquor dining occasions.

But the banquet table is both a cradle and a fence. Overcommitting to liquor-table scenarios has put Mingren into a triple bind—product singularity, brand solidification, and channel imbalance. When the baijiu industry faces pressure and consumption trends shift, this “banquet-table champion” gets stuck in the awkwardness of “not being able to keep going on the banquet table.”

The 4 billion yuan on the banquet table

Mingren’s starting point was a pharmaceutical company in Jiaozuo, Henan.

In 2008, Mingren Pharmaceutical pivoted into water and launched Mingren Soda Water. In the beginning, it broadly positioned itself around “weak-alkali health.” That vague positioning failed to make any waves in the water world.

The turning point came in 2014. When the team reviewed channel data, it found that Mingren held by baijiu distributors moved far better than those held by beverage distributors. The reason: at all kinds of liquor-table gatherings, after drinking baijiu, consumers were accustomed to using soda water to help sober up.

Mingren captured this hidden demand. In 2016, it officially set the tone of “Drink Mingren before and after drinking,” precisely defining soda water from a “general health beverage” into a “baijiu companion.”

At the time, baijiu consumption was at a high point: business banquets and family get-togethers were booming, and “protecting the stomach after drinking” was a must-have. Mingren’s weak-alkali attributes perfectly matched what the liquor table needed. Its pharmaceutical-company DNA allowed it to stand out among a sea of low-quality soda waters.

According to media reports, in 2017 Mingren sold 500 million bottles. By 2024, revenue across the entire industry chain had already surpassed 4 billion yuan; its scale was several times that of major peers, and for many consecutive years it ranked first in the soda water subcategory market.

Data from Nielsen monitoring shows that Mingren’s penetration rate in liquor-and-drinks scenarios reached more than 60% at its peak. By the end of 2024, it had over 3 million retail outlets nationwide, with more than 70% coming from baijiu channels.

To deeply bind drinking scenarios, Mingren also linked up with many baijiu brands and launched “Baijiu + Mingren” bundled meal sets, achieving a win-win.

Mingren’s success is a victory in scenario positioning. Instead of choosing to be an all-round player, it pushed the banquet table niche scenario to the extreme—tearing open a gap in a beverage market crowded by giants.

But this success in a single scenario has been hiding risks from the very beginning.

Outside the banquet table, it’s hard to take a single step

Mingren’s shortcoming is as obvious as its advantage.

When the banquet-table scenario penetration hits its ceiling, the three problems—product, brand, and channel—are concentrated and exposed, becoming the ceiling that constrains its growth.

On the product side, Mingren’s hardest barrier to break through is its lack of diversification. As of 2025, most of its revenue comes from its basic no-sparkling soda water line priced at 3 yuan per bottle. This product is weak-alkali and sugar-free, with a mild taste and few memorable points beyond the banquet-table scenario.

To achieve product breakthroughs, Mingren has kept trying innovations. It launched IP-collaboration editions such as 盗墓笔记 and 非人哉, aiming to attract younger consumers. It doubled down on natural soda water to shake off the label of “artificially adding sodium bicarbonate.” It also developed fruit-flavored variants with the intention of entering dining-with-food scenarios.

But these attempts did not truly help the brand break out of its niche. IP-collaboration editions had limited distribution and did not form large-scale sales momentum. Natural soda water is priced too high and lacks channel support. Fruit-flavored variants faced strong encirclement from giants like Nongfu Spring.

Since it first climbed onto the banquet table, Mingren has wanted soda water to form the recognition of “helps with hangovers and protects the stomach,” “adjusts the body’s acid-alkali balance.” Yet this belief lacks authoritative clinical evidence. As common health knowledge spreads, more and more consumers are questioning the logic behind its messaging.

Industry insiders point out that soda water’s weak-alkali attribute can indeed alleviate excess stomach acid in the short term, but when it comes to “hangover relief and stomach protection,” it’s mostly marketing rhetoric. What’s more, the process of artificially adding sodium bicarbonate is also at odds with today’s trend among younger consumers toward “clean labels.”

The banquet table nurtured Mingren—and also became the label it can’t quite tear off. In many consumers’ minds, Mingren is “soda water made for the banquet table,” not a choice for everyday thirst-quenching or hydration during exercise.

This solidified label makes it difficult for Mingren to move forward in non-banquet scenarios. According to Euromonitor data, Mingren’s penetration rate in everyday drinking scenarios is under 10%, far below Nongfu Spring and Wahaha. Especially among younger groups, its brand awareness is nowhere near that of Nongfu Spring.

Because Mingren mainly relies on a single big SKU to defend the 3-yuan price band, it struggles to move upward. Over the years, it has stayed in the mid-to-low-end market; its brand tone is somewhat “old-fashioned,” lacking expressions that feel younger and more premium.

Overrelying on baijiu distributors has left Mingren’s channel structure seriously imbalanced. Main channels such as supermarkets, convenience stores, and e-commerce have very little say.

On the shelves of supermarkets in first-tier cities, Mingren’s distribution volume is far lower than Nongfu Spring and Wahaha. In online channels, its sales are almost a fraction of Nongfu Spring’s. This heavy dependence on a single channel makes it hard to reach the general consumer base.

What’s even more severe is that gaps in channel management are shaking its foundation.

According to reports from multiple media outlets, starting in the second half of 2024, distributors in multiple regions publicly accused Mingren. A distributor in Henan who had partnered with the company for five years revealed that in 2024 its annual target surged from 20k cases to 55k cases, far beyond its actual sales capacity, leading to massive inventory buildup.

“The company only pushes inventory, and doesn’t provide sales-movement support. The market expenses it fronts—those payments have been pending for more than half a year and still haven’t been reconciled,” the distributor said. The distributor added that many peers nearby had already chosen to terminate the contract.

According to aggregated media coverage, distributors turning against the brand exists across several of Mingren’s core markets. The issues are concentrated on inventory pushing, excuses for end-of-life (near-expiry) stock, and delayed fee reconciliation.

Mingren’s sales mainly depend on distributors. Once trust in the distribution channels collapses, it will inevitably affect its penetration at the retail endpoints.

At the same time, the fast-growing soda water market faces intensifying competition. Nongfu Spring is increasing investment in natural soda water and, leveraging its all-channel advantages, rapidly capturing market share. Nongqi Forest captures younger consumers with younger-leaning, more bubbly product offerings. Wahaha uses a low-price strategy to attack lower-tier markets.

Mingren’s former moat at the banquet table is being continuously eroded.

Can it come down off the banquet table?

Mingren’s founder, Li Qinchuan, once proposed a grand goal: by 2034, revenue should target 10 billion yuan. But given the current situation, this target faces severe challenges.

According to publicly disclosed information from Mingren’s relevant executives, in the first half of 2025, brand revenue increased by more than double digits year over year and achieved the operating target as scheduled. The market generally believes that under the current market environment, Mingren cannot keep growing at the same pace as in the past.

Over the last two years, the baijiu industry has continued to face mounting pressure, showing trends of both volume and price declining, deep adjustments, and increasing differentiation. The performance of leading baijiu companies has fallen, small and midsize enterprises are accelerating their exit and clearing out, and even tobacco-and-liquor shops at terminals are shrinking at a pace close to 20%.

Mingren, which is heavily dependent on baijiu channels, naturally has difficulty staying unaffected. According to media reports, in 2025 its penetration in liquor-and-drinks scenarios is declining, and its share of revenue is also decreasing.

To break the deadlock, Mingren proposed a “two-scenario” strategy, adding a “huoshao long” positioning and moving into heavy-flavor dining scenarios such as hot pot, barbecue, and crayfish. But in essence, this is still an extension of the banquet-table scenario—it has not truly shifted toward everyday mainstream consumption.

At the 2026 Spring Sugar and Wine (Spring Candy) Fair, Mingren made a high-profile layout, trying to continue to penetrate the liquor industry through “city-show integration” and strengthen the “drinking buddy” mindshare. However, this kind of investment has not addressed the core weakness of its path dependency.

From management to distributors, Mingren’s entire system has already adapted to “banquet-table logic.” Product R&D, channel layout, and marketing promotion all revolve around the banquet table. To truly achieve a breakthrough, it will face a need to reconstruct the whole system.

Getting out of the comfort zone of the banquet table cannot be done overnight. Product upgrades require R&D investment. Breaking out of the brand niche requires marketing innovation. Rebuilding channels requires breaking the existing vested-interest structure.

Competition in the beverage industry has never been competition in only one scenario. If Mingren keeps craving the banquet-table bonus, it will only lose the upward momentum in the full-scenario era.

Author’s statement: The author’s viewpoints are personal opinions and are provided for reference only.