ICBC “Inside Man” Bank President Fraud: 78 Customers’ 560 Million Yuan in Hard-Earned Money Lost with No Hope of Recovery

(Author: Finance Fan)

When the role of “manager” becomes a pass for fraud, and the bank’s customer service hall turns into a crime scene, where should depositors place their trust?

Former Weifang Zaozi Sub-branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) business hall director Liu Fang used her position for years to amass money crazily—earning more than 560 million yuan—by fabricating wealth management, taking in funds without recording them, and defrauding customers into obtaining pledged loans, leaving 78 customers without a penny. In November 2025, Liu Fang was finally sentenced to 17 years and 6 months, but the victims’ pursuit of compensation remains a long and arduous path; eight victim elderly people have already died while waiting.

A “two-faced manager” who steals under the protection of his authority

During Liu Fang’s tenure as business hall director and assistant to the president at the ICBC Weifang Zaozi Sub-branch, she leveraged her customers’ absolute trust in her identity as a “bank executive” to carry out a chain of interlocking fraud.

Liu Fang fabricated high-yield wealth management. In the bank’s office premises, she recommended “internal high-yield wealth management products” that did not exist, forged and stamped the bank’s seal on a “Personal Wealth Management Application Form,” and induced customers to transfer their funds into her controlled personal accounts.

She used customers’ funds that should have been deposited into the bank system for high-risk investments on platforms such as the “Tianjin Precious Metals Exchange,” causing massive losses.

After the capital chain broke, Liu Fang falsely claimed she could arrange “interest-free” wealth management pledged loans, tricked customers into giving her their U-Key password, forged signatures to divert the loan funds, and used the diverted money to fill earlier gaps.

How was trust overdrawn?

Liu Fang hired a member of society, Hu Moumou, to assist her in handling “business” inside the bank’s customer service hall while wearing bank uniforms, creating an appearance of legitimacy.

Deliberately bypassing the bank’s “dual recording” (audio and video recording) requirements, she handled online banking on behalf of customers, required customers to provide passwords, and had funds directly transferred into her personal account.

Liu Fang forged customer signatures on loan contracts; yet the scheme still passed the bank’s internal approval and review process. Loans were disbursed on the same day into her personal account, exposing serious weaknesses in the bank’s internal controls.

A long legal fight for rights and a silent tragedy

Liu Fang has already been convicted in criminal proceedings, but civil compensation is difficult. Although Liu Fang has been imprisoned, her personal assets are far from enough to cover the 560 million yuan loss. Victims have filed civil lawsuits against ICBC, demanding the bank bear responsibility for dereliction of management, and the cases are still under review.

The criminal trial took 5 and a half years. Among the 78 victims, eight elderly people were unable to wait for compensation and died with regrets, leaving endless sorrow.

How to identify a “manager” scam?

For legitimate bank wealth management funds, they must be transferred to the bank’s corporate custody account; it is strictly forbidden to transfer them into any personal account or third-party company account.

It is strictly forbidden to hand over your mobile phone, U-Key, or password to bank employees for them to operate.

For legitimate procedures, the person concerned must confirm in person at the counter or through mobile banking.

Before purchasing, be sure to log in to the bank’s official website or app to check the product code. Any product that cannot be found in the bank system is a “feiyang” (off-system sales) scam or fraud.

If the promised annualized return is far above normal market levels (for example, above 8%) and it claims principal protection and interest guarantees, it is highly likely a scam.

The case of Liu Fang proves once again that even the most impressive positions cannot be an “inspection-exempt” label for trust. When depositors handle business, they must stick to the bottom line—“funds do not transfer to personal accounts, passwords are not handed to others, and read the contract terms carefully”—and never relax vigilance because of a “acquaintance” or “executive” identity. As a financial institution, banks should also further strengthen management of employee conduct, build an internal control firewall, and effectively protect ordinary people’s “money bags.”

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