Traffic Jam "Stuck" Its Way to Trending, So Why Can't It Unblock Gu Jing Gong Jiu's Performance "Jam"?

Sina Finance’s “Liquor Price Insider” Launches with a Bang: Know the Real Market Prices of Famous Baijiu

“Green liquid,” “Green wave-like,” “Good green liquid”… If it weren’t for the epic traffic jam during the Spring Festival, probably no one would notice the billboard standing on the highway in Anhui, which leaves countless drivers scratching their heads.

How exactly are these three characters read? Instantly, a nationwide discussion on “literacy rate” erupted, with related topics easily surpassing 100 million views.

In response to this sudden “meme creation,” the behind-the-scenes operator—Mingguang Distillery under Gujinggong Liquor (000596.SZ)—had to clarify immediately: it’s called “Ming Green Liquid,” with the font designed by the late calligrapher Xie Deping.

Ironically, this billboard, mocked by netizens as “the biggest wrongful advertising in history,” has stood alone for many years. The advertising industry has long concluded: they spent a lot of money, but didn’t make their name memorable.

However, the magic of traffic lies precisely here. When the anxiety of traffic jams meets the confusion of literacy, Gujinggong Liquor keenly seized this wave of popularity. In just a week, its subsidiary Gujing Light Nourishing Society quickly launched a matching “Milk Green Wave” milk tea priced at 16 yuan, forming the so-called “Mingguang Three-piece Set” with “Wang Green Wave Mung Bean Cake” and “Ming Green Liquid Liquor.”

From being mocked to being sought after, Gujinggong Liquor once again proved its “marketing master” status. But when we peel back the fog of traffic, examine the financial reports and strategies of this leading Huizhou liquor company, we find an awkward reality: amid the deep adjustments in the Baijiu industry, Gujinggong Liquor is undergoing an unprecedented “stress test.”

Despite being the elder in Huizhou liquor, Gujinggong has not broken out of its independent market. In the first three quarters of 2025, the company’s revenue was 16.425 billion yuan, down 13.87% year-on-year; net profit attributable to shareholders was 3.96 billion yuan, down 16.57%.

Chairman Liang Jinhui’s ambitious target of “300 billion yuan in revenue by 2025” now seems unlikely to be achieved.

Traffic will eventually fade. When the “Milk Green Wave” hype subsides, the outside world is more concerned about how far Gujinggong Liquor can go.

This “outing” of Ming Green Liquid seems like luck brought by the traffic jam, but in fact, it is an accidental realization of Gujinggong’s long-term “high-profile” strategy.

The last time Ming Green Liquid received such attention was five years ago. At that time, Gujinggong Liquor acquired a 60% stake in Mingguang Distillery for 200 million yuan in a lightning deal, bringing it under its umbrella.

Behind this deal lie two anxieties and ambitions of Gujinggong: one is to fill its own gaps; the other is to improve its product matrix.

On one hand, although Gujinggong is the leading Huizhou liquor brand, it has long been a “blind spot” in the Chuzhou area of eastern Anhui. Mingguang Distillery, rooted locally for decades, perfectly fills this gap.

Additionally, Mingguang Distillery has an annual capacity of about 30,000 tons (about one-third of Gujinggong’s current capacity), which can ease the production pressure during Gujinggong’s technological upgrades.

On the other hand, Ming Green Liquid’s “Ming Green Fragrant Type” complements Gujinggong’s strong aroma style, expanding its aroma portfolio and forming a product matrix of “three products, four aromas.”

Unlike other Baijiu, Ming Green Liquid uses mung beans as the core raw material, combined with sorghum and wheat, emphasizing the fusion of mung bean aroma and aged aroma, and proposing the exclusive “Ming Green Fragrance” type.

Due to its unique ingredients and flavor profile, Ming Green Liquid was once praised as a “rare flower in liquor,” awarded high-quality product status by the Ministry of Light Industry, and recognized as a famous trademark of Anhui Province after the new millennium. Its brewing process has also been patented nationally.

Few know that Ming Green Liquid is one of the few high-end Baijiu in Anhui priced in the thousands. The 53-degree Ming Green Liquid is nicknamed “Green Moutai” (green Maotai) in the industry. The official price is 1,280 yuan per bottle, with a transaction price around 800 yuan, comparable to top-tier high-end Baijiu.

After being acquired by Gujinggong, Mingguang Distillery entered the fast lane.

Before the acquisition, Mingguang Distillery’s annual sales were around 300 million to 400 million yuan, but after the purchase, it continued to grow rapidly—breaking 600 million yuan the next year, surpassing 1 billion yuan in 2023, and reaching 1.1 billion yuan in 2024 (including taxes and market investments, reportedly reaching 1.5 billion yuan). Especially, Green Moutai contributed over 60% of the revenue.

Objectively speaking, Gujinggong’s support for Ming Green Liquid after acquisition has been substantial.

For example, Mingguang Distillery adopted Gujinggong’s “Three-Connection Project” and other mature tactics, focusing on brand shaping; after the “Gu-Ming Collaboration,” Mingguang Distillery launched a “visible, perceptible, felt” large-scale brand communication campaign, targeting major media and transportation hubs. The giant billboards along highways were erected during this period.

To some extent, Ming Green Liquid’s sudden popularity is not accidental but a natural result of Gujinggong’s long-term saturation marketing strategy, triggered by a sudden event.

However, Ming Green Liquid’s unexpected surge also masks the fatigue in Gujinggong’s overall marketing approach.

Some netizens jokingly call Gujinggong a “Spring Festival Gala staple,” which is not an exaggeration.

Since 2016, Gujinggong has appeared as a designated partner on the CCTV Spring Festival Gala, and by 2026, it will have been an “exclusive sponsor” for 11 consecutive years.

Besides the Gala, Gujinggong has sponsored Anhui Satellite TV’s Spring Festival Gala for many years. It has also sponsored Jiangsu Satellite TV’s Lantern Festival Gala and Anhui Satellite TV’s Lantern Festival Song and Dance Gala.

This approach has led to continuously rising sales expenses.

Financial reports show that Gujinggong’s sales expenses exceeded 2 billion yuan in 2017, 3 billion in 2019, 4 billion in 2021, over 5 billion in 2023, and more than 6 billion in 2024.

From 2021 to 2024, total sales expenses reached about 20.3 billion yuan; including the first three quarters of 2025, nearly 25 billion yuan.

Despite the heavy spending, the results have not proportionally improved.

Compared to other industry giants like Kweichow Moutai, Luzhou Laojiao, Shanxi Fenjiu, and Yanghe, Gujinggong’s sales expenses are among the highest, even surpassing them. However, its brand recognition outside of its home province is far less than Moutai or Wuliangye.

Among listed Baijiu companies, Gujinggong ranks sixth in revenue, behind the top five giants: Moutai, Wuliangye, Shanxi Fenjiu, Luzhou Laojiao, and Yanghe. Among these six, Gujinggong’s sales expenses and expense ratio are among the highest, with the highest expense ratio.

In short, Gujinggong’s traditional marketing-heavy approach is beginning to falter.

For example, Gujinggong’s revenue broke 10 billion yuan in 2019 and 20 billion yuan in 2023. At the end of 2023 and early 2024, it announced a goal of 30 billion yuan in revenue by 2025.

But according to financial reports, in the first three quarters of 2025, Gujinggong’s revenue was 16.425 billion yuan, down 13.87% year-on-year; net profit was 3.96 billion yuan, down 16.57%. This target is unlikely to be achieved.

The growth logic of the Baijiu industry has always been clear: either upscale or nationwide. For regional brands, the latter is a matter of life and death.

In 2014, Liang Jinhui, known for his marketing prowess, officially became the new leader of Gujinggong. He aggressively expanded into the mid-to-high-end Baijiu market, promoting “aged original mash” nationwide, and increased marketing spending;

Meanwhile, through “self-expansion + external acquisitions,” he sought to develop the national market, acquiring brands like Huanghelou and Mingguang, forming multiple aroma types such as strong, light, sauce, and Ming Green.

The results were immediate.

In just five years, Gujinggong’s revenue first surpassed 10 billion yuan, then in 2024, it successfully reached 20 billion yuan.

Within the Baijiu industry, the thresholds of 50 billion, 20 billion, and 10 billion yuan are used to define the first, second, and third tiers. Among them, 20 billion yuan is seen as a dividing line between national and regional brands.

However, reaching 20 billion yuan is not a guarantee of nationwide recognition. The real test is the proportion of revenue outside the province.

On the surface, Gujinggong has taken a step toward becoming a national Baijiu brand. But closer inspection shows that, compared to Yanghe and Shanxi Fenjiu, whose outside-province revenue share exceeds 50%, Gujinggong still retains a “provincial” impression.

As the leading Huizhou liquor with a strong brand gene, Gujinggong’s market share is roughly 60% inside Anhui and 40% outside. Regionally, over 85% of its revenue comes from Central China, with Anhui as its core market.

Despite exceeding 20 billion yuan in revenue, it is still classified as a provincial brand—a curse that seems hard to break.

Looking back at Gujinggong’s history, it dates back to the Ming Dynasty’s Zhengde era as one of the “Old Eight Famous Liquors,” once shining brightly—by 1997, its revenue reached 960 million yuan, ranking third after Wuliangye and Luzhou Laojiao.

However, due to blind diversification and management corruption, Gujinggong missed the golden decade of Baijiu and retreated from being a national brand to a regional one.

Particularly, its early “lowering alcohol content and prices” strategy prevented it from keeping pace with the high-end trend of Baijiu, deeply affecting its high-end brand image.

For example, Gujinggong’s core strategy is “nationalization, mid-to-high-end, continuous product structure optimization, deep cultivation of different price segments;” continuing to focus on “Gujing 20” as a strategic pivot to capture the mid-to-high-end consumer group; and further expanding the market share of popular products like Gu 8, Gu 5, Xianli, and old famous liquors to meet consumer demand across price ranges.

In Anhui, Gujinggong’s price range is comprehensive and very strong locally. Whether at festivals, banquets, or in catering and hotel channels, it is highly recognized by consumers. But this is mostly within the 500 yuan or less segment.

The high-end market above 500 yuan is basically dominated by outside brands like Moutai, Langjiu, Xijiu, Fenjiu, and Wuliangye, not Gujinggong or other local Anhui brands.

According to industry research, the Anhui Baijiu market is about 40 billion yuan in 2024, with foreign brands like Moutai and Wuliangye holding 25-30%, roughly 10 to 12 billion yuan.

The industry’s traditional “Western not entering Sichuan, Eastern not entering Anhui” saying refers to the fact that Sichuan and Anhui produce many famous liquors, making it hard for outsiders to break in. But the “Eastern not entering Anhui” pattern is gradually being torn open, forcing Gujinggong to deepen its Anhui roots while urgently seeking to expand beyond.

In fact, Gujinggong faces high-end competition not only within Anhui but also on its path outside, as its mid-to-high-end positioning makes it vulnerable to other brands.

Take its flagship “Aged Original Mash” as an example. As early as 1997, Gujinggong launched “Ten-Year Original Mash,” transplanting the concept of “aged liquor” into Baijiu.

Most consumers understand “Original Mash” as unblended “base liquor,” with the number indicating the years of aging—e.g., Gu 20 for 20 years. However, Gujinggong’s official stance is that “Aged Original Mash” does not mean aged liquor; it’s a trademark name, and the number suffix does not represent the brewing age as commonly understood.

This controversy has even become a “weapon” for many well-known liquor companies to defend against Gujinggong.

The traffic on highways will eventually clear, and the “Ming Green Liquid” meme will fade with time.

When the hype subsides, the naked truth will surface. For Gujinggong, how to break the “provincial” curse and carve a path in the high-end market is a more profound question than “Milk Green Wave” milk tea.

After all, in capital markets, stories can be told for a while, but performance must be backed by real results. The unfulfilled goal of 30 billion yuan may be the starting point of Gujinggong’s new transformation or the end of its growth ceiling.