Actual controllers, executives, and old shareholders are all fleeing—what's wrong with the "Monkey King"?

Questioning AI · Why did Suzhou Gujia suddenly liquidate after holding shares for 18 years?

The mystery has been solved by Fenjiu

China’s router king was reported to have purchased “Trump Gold Card”

Source | Deep Blue Finance

Written by | Wang Xin

In the past few days, the most interesting event in the pharmaceutical sector is the leading CRO company, Zhaoyan New Drug.

It all started on Sunday evening when Zhaoyan New Drug announced that the fourth largest shareholder, Gu Xiaolei, and the seventh largest shareholder, Gu Meifang (uncle and niece), planned to completely liquidate their holdings, selling all 30.74 million shares, accounting for 4.1% of the total share capital. The reason given was simply—their own funding needs.

On Monday, March 17, Zhaoyan New Drug’s A-shares hit the daily limit down, and H-shares fell 11.7%. After the plunge, the stock price had nearly halved from its early-year high.

What’s more darkly humorous is that, seeing the stock price collapse, the two quickly “backed down,” urgently modifying their plan that evening to reduce their liquidation to no more than 3% of the total share capital, roughly cashing out about 700 million yuan, staging a “correcting mistake” that benefits investors.

This almost childish operation has retail investors wanting to curse, while institutions might find it amusing. But what’s truly worth pondering is: Gujia from Suzhou has had a strategic investment in Zhaoyan New Drug for 18 years, and Gu Xiaolei and Gu Meifang were once company directors. Why are they suddenly running now?

“Slipper King” Family’s Liquidation

Suzhou Taicang Gujia is well-known in China’s pharmaceutical industry.

Gu Xiaolei’s grandfather, Gu Jianping, was the secretary of Xiangtang Village in the 1970s. He started by processing velvet slippers for Shanghai companies, earning the nickname “Slipper King.” In 2000, he established Xiangtang Group based on a shoe factory, transforming into a rising private enterprise in Taicang through restructuring.

Now, Xiangtang Group’s chairman is Gu Xiaolei’s father, Gu Zhenqi. Gu Meifang is Gu Zhenqi’s sister.

The Gu family first entered the pharmaceutical industry in 2002. Gu Jianping, through Japanese partners, connected with Beijing entrepreneurs Zhou Zhiwen and Feng Yuxia. Gu Jianping invested 30 million yuan in their pharmaceutical venture, which later became Shute Shen.

Before Shute Shen, Zhou Zhiwen and Feng Yuxia had already founded Zhaoyan New Drug.

In 2008, the Gu family invested in Zhaoyan New Drug, forming the current shareholding structure. Since then, Xiangtang Group has invested in nine biopharmaceutical companies, all of which became major clients during Zhaoyan’s early listing phase.

According to this pattern, Xiangtang Group might become China’s second Fosun Pharma someday.

Especially when Zhaoyan New Drug’s stock was high in the past two years, Gu family members did not significantly reduce their holdings. Why are they liquidating now?

Public information might offer some clues.

In 2022, Xiangtang Group ranked 476th among China’s top 500 manufacturing private enterprises, with annual revenue of 13.523 billion yuan (2021 data).

In 2023, it ranked 87th among Jiangsu’s top 100 private enterprises, with revenue of 14.52 billion yuan (2022 data).

By October 2025, on the Jiangsu Top 200 Private Enterprises list, Xiangtang Group ranked 172nd, with 2024 revenue of 9.804 billion yuan.

Xiangtang Group has four main business segments: biopharmaceuticals (first), followed by intelligent manufacturing, financial venture capital, and real estate.

Revenue dropped from 14.5 billion to 9.8 billion yuan. Which segment is likely the problem?

More insiders are leaving faster

Gujia’s recent moves are eye-catching, but if we look at the company’s own people, they are leaving even faster.

In January this year, the company’s male actual controller, Zhou Zhiwen, made a big move—through block trades and centralized bidding, reducing his holdings by 14.979 million shares, cashing out about 568 million yuan.

Since this reduction, Zhaoyan New Drug’s stock price has been declining steadily, with the latest closing price 22.72% below his average selling price.

Looking further back, from September to November 2025, multiple directors and senior managers sold a total of 422,400 shares.

It’s worth noting that between November 2020 and February 2021, Zhou Zhiwen and Feng Yuxia’s family sold shares in excess of the allowed proportion, with delayed disclosure of over a year, and in February 2024, the Beijing Securities Regulatory Bureau issued a warning letter.

Since the first sale in November 2020, Zhou Zhiwen has cashed out approximately 1.52 billion yuan.

The actual controller is leaving, senior executives are leaving, major shareholders are leaving—Zhaoyan New Drug’s situation resembles “Monkey King eager to come down from the tree.”

Relying on Monkey Raising to Support Profits

Looking at Zhaoyan New Drug itself.

On January 21, the company issued a “performance forecast” indicating that revenue in 2025 is expected to decrease by 13.9%–22.1%, but net profit will increase by 214%–371%.

This means that the profit growth is not driven by core services like drug safety evaluation or pharmacodynamics research.

Why did net profit surge? The secret lies in biological assets.

In A-share companies, living biological assets are classified as “biological assets” and valued at fair value. For Zhaoyan New Drug, these biological assets are experimental monkeys. At year-end, the market value of the monkeys is calculated into the profit statement.

Currently, Zhaoyan New Drug is one of the domestic CROs with the most monkey resources, known as the “Monkey King.”

In 2024, monkey prices fell, and the company recognized a impairment loss of nearly 200 million yuan. Early 2025, the biological assets on the books were initially valued at 383 million yuan. But by the end of June, as monkey prices continued to decline, another loss of 22.14 million yuan was recognized.

However, according to Zhaoyan, in the second half of 2025, the monkeys suddenly “soared to the sky,” with fair value at year-end jumping over 450 million yuan. Notably, in June last year, the monkeys were only worth 376 million yuan, more than doubling in value in half a year, while the number of monkeys remained relatively stable.

Monkey prices are indeed rising. According to procurement info from Wuhan Institute of Virology in April 2025, 9 crab-eating monkeys with a budget of 855,000 yuan had an average unit price of about 95,000 yuan. By February this year, Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica’s tender for 450 monkeys with a budget of 62 million yuan had an average unit price of about 137,000 yuan.

Adding natural growth and appreciation of the monkeys, the value increases stepwise from juvenile to young adult to suitable experimental age, collectively pushing the company’s biological asset fair value higher.

But the problem is, raising monkeys as a resource barrier also amplifies the company’s vulnerabilities.

“Monkey King” Troubles

On February 26, this year, the “Study Times” published an article titled “Actively Seizing the High Ground of Digital Cell Technology,” mentioning “simulated cells,” which is the FDA’s recent push to gradually phase out animal testing in favor of AI toxicity prediction and organoid testing.

What is the “Study Times”? No need to explain.

Coincidentally, recent news reports that Roche plans to buy 2,176 Nvidia chips to expand AI infrastructure. The US-China AI competition’s flames will eventually reach the pharmaceutical industry. How much monkeys are worth may become less important in the future.

Looking at the company’s core business, the CRO industry has been shifting from a “sweet spot” to a “big lady,” with overcapacity, declining orders, and intense price competition, leading to a continuous decline in gross profit margin. Meanwhile, monkey prices fluctuate, and in 2023 and 2024, the company’s net profits plummeted by 63% and 81%, respectively.

This is not the worst—in 2025, main business segments like laboratory services will lose between 130 million and 210 million yuan, marking the company’s first full-year loss since listing. Currently, the market value has shrunk nearly 70% from its 2021 peak.

This may be the real reason behind Taicang Gujia’s liquidation, also signaling a turning point in an era.

However, with the overall environment warming, the explosive growth of emerging tracks like antibodies and small nucleic acids, and the enhancement of overseas business, there remains a possibility to rewrite the ending.