Genie Microelectronics split off 800 million and doesn't lack money, wanting to make a big move in the A-share market.

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Source: Scale Business

Text | Li Delin Editing | Liu Zhentao

Not short of money, absolutely not short of money. Opening the financial statements of A-share listed companies, those with a debt-to-asset ratio below 10% are extremely rare. There is one company whose debt ratio is less than 9%, with dividends exceeding 860 million yuan, and it’s not short of money. The boss always has a dream—to make a big deal in the A-share market. He initially wanted to raise around 2.5 billion yuan, but after two regulatory penalties, he never lost enthusiasm for their IPO. After several attempts, now he’s aiming for 1 billion yuan. Will this IPO succeed?

At the IPO gate, it’s truly a tale of two extremes. Some companies are on the brink of collapse without going public, while others are not short of money and just want to gain some face in the A-share market and raise a little cash. Today’s main character is Jieli Technology, founded in 2010, mainly engaged in integrated circuit design for system chips, with products mainly used in Bluetooth headsets, speakers, smart wearables, and more. The company is clearly not short of money. Since 2017, Jieli Technology has been trying to list on the Shanghai Stock Exchange Main Board, then the ChiNext, and later the Beijing Stock Exchange, all just to get listed.

According to the latest financial data released by Jieli Technology, its 2022 debt ratio was 15.52%. By 2024, it had dropped to 8.81%. In the first half of 2025, it further decreased to 7.77%. Among 5,484 listed A-share companies, a debt ratio like Jieli’s would definitely rank in the top 5%. Updated financial data shows that by the end of December 2025, the company’s cash and large certificates of deposit, fixed-term deposits, totaled over 2.3 billion yuan. In short, the company is not short of money.

With money, dividends follow. From publicly disclosed data, in 2020, dividends reached 469 million yuan—the largest before this IPO. In 2021, due to busy preparations for the third IPO and internal restructuring, no dividends were paid. In 2022, dividends resumed at 99.62 million yuan; in 2023, they paid 200 million yuan; in the first three quarters of 2024, dividends totaled 100 million yuan. In total, four rounds of dividends amounted to 869 million yuan. Jieli Technology’s four partners hold a combined 63.01% of the shares, meaning about 547 million yuan flowed into their pockets. The four also jointly hold over 80% of the voting rights.

While continuously paying dividends, Jieli Technology has been tirelessly pursuing an IPO. In March 2017, it first filed for listing on the Shanghai Main Board. Soon, regulators discovered internal control issues—chaotic management, using personal bank accounts for company transactions, many flows through the controlling shareholder’s account, and abnormal fund dealings with related parties—making it impossible to verify the authenticity of financial data. Jieli Technology voluntarily withdrew its IPO application.

If the financial data can’t be trusted, going public is just harmful.

But Jieli Technology was persistent. A year later, it refiled, still aiming for the Shanghai Main Board. Due to past issues, the IPO process involved random inspections. Honestly, many companies that are selected have various problems. Jieli was chosen, and it was found that the initial issues had not been resolved. The CSRC saw that the problems remained unaddressed—was this a test of the officials’ patience or a test of the regulators’ intelligence? Jieli Technology received a warning letter from the CSRC.

The CSRC warned them. Do you think that Jieli Technology, which is not short of money, would just settle down? Just kidding! In 2021, Jieli Technology refiled again, this time applying to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s ChiNext. For this IPO, Jieli Technology spared no effort—no dividends, and introduced star shareholders like Xiaomi and Huahong. The fundraising target was unprecedentedly increased to 2.5 billion yuan. After nearly a year of efforts, it was again selected for on-site supervision. The problems were the same—abnormal fund flows, weak internal controls, no reasonable explanation.

The company wants to go public, but the problems are huge. The CSRC warned them, yet they thought changing venues would let them get away with it—ridiculous. Regulators are very angry. Jieli Technology has repeatedly refused to change its ways. This behavior of trying to test the regulators’ patience by switching venues again and again has angered the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which issued another regulatory letter. Naturally, the IPO was blocked. It’s hard to believe—after three tries, does Jieli really think regulators are easy to fool? Financial authenticity is fundamental for listed companies—this is no game.

By December 2024, Jieli Technology filed again, this time choosing the Beijing Stock Exchange, with a reduced fundraising scale of 1.08 billion yuan—down 56%. The BSE conducted three rounds of inquiries, and the issues remained internal control, performance, and sales—problems from the first three attempts. It’s clear that the company’s fundamental issues remain unresolved. Basic financial questions are still unclear. A company that is not short of money, which has gone through three listing attempts, paid large dividends before listing—could Jieli Technology simply be in the market just to raise money?

The A-share market is not a place for fools with lots of money. After so many years of trying, the problems remain unsolved, and they can’t raise money anymore. From switching from the Shanghai to the Shenzhen, and now to the Beijing Stock Exchange, the regulatory standards are believed to be the same. Changing venues repeatedly doesn’t mean the regulators’ IQ is lowered. By 2025, the company’s performance started to decline from the first quarter. In the first half of 2025, net profit excluding non-recurring gains and losses dropped more than 27% year-on-year. By the third quarter, the decline showed no signs of easing.

Jieli Technology’s financial data in 2025 began to worsen. Behind the revenue and net profit decline, gross margin fell by 5.45 percentage points compared to 2024, below the industry average of about 40%. To some extent, Jieli is sacrificing gross profit to gain market share through low-price strategies, indicating its products’ market influence may be weakening. Inventory levels reveal this as well—since 2022, inventory has accounted for over 23% of current assets. Chip iteration is fast, and inventory write-downs have remained relatively high.

Looking at Jieli’s IPO materials, they plan to raise 1 billion yuan this time to fund high-end chip R&D, manufacturing, and working capital. The BSE asked 12 questions, mainly about the company’s declining performance, slow technological iteration, and whether they can develop high-end chips. The company relies on external suppliers for capacity, with no own manufacturing base—where is the need for industrial upgrading? They have money for dividends but not for development. Why is IPO fundraising necessary?

A company with no short-term or long-term loans, holding over a billion yuan in cash and several billion in deposits, with bosses paying hefty dividends, having gone through multiple exchanges and regulatory penalties, constantly switching venues just to get listed—aiming to make a big profit in the A-share market. From their current scale of a few hundred million to over 2 billion yuan in fundraising, it’s clear that “raising money” is written all over their face—just not successful yet. Now, with only 1 billion yuan, they are scheduled for review again on March 20. They are relentless. Facing the cash-rich “money-raising” attempt, the public might say they are like mice with guns, already plotting to catch the cat.

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