DAO governance has a serious design problem. Vitalik Buterin recently highlighted that current token-holder voting models aren't cutting it—they're inefficient and fundamentally fail to solve the core issues plaguing decentralized organizations. The existing setup? It's not working. Standard token-voting mechanisms fall short because they ignore participation costs, create plutocratic tendencies, and struggle with voter apathy. Vitalik's pushing for rethinking beyond the standard playbook: exploring alternative governance layers, quadratic voting systems, or delegation models that actually align incentives. The crypto community is waking up to this reality—you can't just slap token voting on a DAO and call it decentralized. Real governance requires better architectural thinking. Whether it's improving voting mechanisms, refining delegation protocols, or introducing novel participation frameworks, the space needs to evolve past these mechanical approaches. The conversation Vitalik sparked is critical: how do we build DAOs that are genuinely effective AND aligned with decentralization principles?